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* Professor of International Economics, University of Copenhagen 
  Six years ago, shortly before the start of Economic and Monetary Union on 1 
January 1999, I was invited to give the Marjolin Lecture at a Colloquium in Frankfurt 
(held by SUERF). I had chosen the title: "Evolving Ambitions in Europe's Monetary 
Unification"1, identifying as the two core achievements of EMU the simultaneous 
elimination of nominal exchange-rate fluctuations between the participants and of nearly 
all of the inflation of the previous three decades. Other economic ambitions had also at 
times provided additional inspiration for the unification process: better coordination of 
non-monetary macroeconomic policies, the development of a stronger role for Europe in 
the international monetary system and the realisation of an integrated financial market, 
underpinned by convergent supervisory and regulatory practices. The launching of the 
Euro would make the realisation of these additional ambitions possible, but could not in 
itself assure it. 
This framework seems to me still broadly appropriate six years later. So I shall start with a 
personal historical perspective, necessarily highly selective and idiosyncratic, on the long 
process leading up to 1999, moving subsequently to a briefer evaluation of how EMU has 
worked in its first six years and of the current state of the other ambitions identified. Here 
there is obviously a good deal of accumulated evidence. It is also necessary in this section 
to ask why the overall economic performance of the Euro area has remained disappointing 
despite EMU. 
A final section of this lecture is my acknowledgement of the substantial intellectual debts I 
have incurred in my long association with the University of Copenhagen and with the 
many colleagues, academic economists and officials, who have shared a keen engagement 
in Europe's monetary unification, not least those who have shown me the honour of 
participating in to-day's conference. I have prepared this lecture without the benefit of 
knowing what they were going to say to-day and I have heard a great deal that I would like 
to reflect on2. 
  
A personal historical perspective 1973-98 
 My early work as an academic economist was on monetary theory and 
policy, initially in the context of my own country, from the early 1970s in a comparative 
context when directing at the OECD a series of studies on the role of monetary policy in 
demand management in six large industrial economies3. Much of this work was aimed at 
evaluating large-scale models of the monetary transmission mechanism. At that time this 
topic required one to focus more on various methods of direct intervention in credit flows 
and of capital controls than on the interaction of economies and the importance of the 
exchange-rate regime; anyway, most of the experience was at that time with fixed rates. 
For that reason my co-author Kumi Shigehara and I were taken severely to task by more 
                                                 
1 Artis, Weber and Hennessy (eds.) (2000). 
2 Birch Sørensen (ed.) (2004) 
3 OECD Monetary Studies Series ending with summary volume OECD (1975) 
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globalist monetary economists (such as Harry Johnson and Karl Brunner) when the results 
were presented at the UK Money Study Group and the Konstanz Seminar: we had not 
sufficiently absorbed the work of Mundell and McKinnon on the international aspects of 
money creation and inflation and the policy rules implicit in this approach for the design of 
international or regional monetary coordination. 
In this respect I was soon to learn more. Denmark had joined the European Economic 
Community (as it was then called) in 1973 and the creation of an Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) was at that time still formally on the agenda. Towards the end of 1973 I was 
asked by the European Commission to serve on an expert group, chaired by former 
Commission Vice President Robert Marjolin, charged with evaluating whether EMU was 
still feasible by 1980 and, if so, what steps should be taken to get there. 
This was a rude awakening to reality, because the answer clearly had to be no. Europe was 
entering a cycle of inflation at double-digit rates in several countries. Remarkable 
divergence had become visible in the national policy responses to the international 
disturbances in the form of the first massive oil price hike and major dollar depreciation as 
the Bretton Woods system –  which had provided a comforting framework also at the 
European regional level until around 1970 - broke up. Some of the members of our group 
had been centrally involved in the preparation of the Werner Plan for EMU of 1970 and 
still felt that, if only the governments had been bolder and moved rapidly to locking 
exchange rates then, the project might have been saved. But most of my colleagues, 
including the two most senior economists in the group, Herbert Giersch and Donald 
McDougall, were far more sceptical. They pushed us to focus on more immediate tasks 
such as containing the flare-up of inflation and developing mechanisms for balance-of-
payments support between the member states. 
Robert Marjolin gave the conclusions of our report a stark twist. Like some others of his 
enviable generation who had played important roles in the early post-war reconstruction of 
Europe when major strides in economic co-operation were made on a regular basis, he had 
become somewhat cynical and, in particular, had retained little respect for his political 
successors. Politicians have no real understanding of what is involved in EMU, the 
Marjolin Report argues. This was probably not an unfair assessment, although they had 
been warned; the Werner Report had argued that EMU would require not only a 
"community system for the central banks" somewhat like the US Federal Reserve, but 
also" a Centre of decision for economic policy" with decisive influence over national 
budgetary policies and politically responsible to the European Parliament4. This second 
institutional innovation reflected the optimism prevailing in the late 1960s in policy circles 
and backed by many prominent academics regarding the stabilising properties of budgetary 
policies. So it may have been more accurate to say that the politicians by the mid-1970s 
had understood what such a version of EMU would require, found it excessive and backed 
down from it – except to continue to pay lip service to the ideal. 
                                                 
4 See Baer and Padoa-Schioppa (1989) 
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On a couple of points Marjolin no doubt went too far. In his Memoirs of 19865 he notes 
with some pride that the report which his group produced had one effect: "there was no 
more talk of EMU" and he speculates that the European Monetary System (EMS), set up a 
few years later was a practical arrangement responding to the problems identified in the 
report and not a step towards EMU. Anyway I was soon to experience that EMU in the 
sense of rigidly fixed exchange rates (or a single currency) combined with low inflation 
was still some time off. 
The Commission did not appreciate the tone of the Marjolin Report and it was never 
published. Instead two follow-up working groups were launched – one on the EEC as an 
optimum currency area and another on how the principles of fiscal federalism could be 
applied to the design of the Community budget. Although I became a member of the 
former group, labelled OPTICA, I have to recognise that the second group, chaired by 
Donald McDougall, probably made a more lasting contribution6. But its conclusion, viz. 
that there was a strong case on efficiency and allocation grounds, for a significant 
Community budget, scared national policy-makers to take this issue off the EEC agenda 
when Commission President Roy Jenkins tried to advance it in 1977. It has not really come 
back since. 
The OPTICA-group in its two reports7 basically agreed that on the basis of the experience 
of the mid-1970s, movements in intra-EEC exchange rates had become an important 
source of disturbance rather than a mechanism of adjustment. Excess inflation in countries 
such as Italy and the United Kingdom had been overcompensated by depreciations of the 
lira and of sterling which then fed further inflation. To constrain spirals in prices and 
exchange rates, the OPTICA- group proposed a version of a PPP-rule for managing intra-
EEC nominal exchange rates: rates should not be allowed to change faster than indicated 
by inflation differentials, and preferably more slowly. 
Some of us in the OPTICA-group thought this agenda was too defensive, so we joined a 
parallel private initiative which saw efforts at European monetary integration as a vehicle 
for sharply reducing inflation in Europe, rather than for accommodating existing inflation 
differentials. Such an approach was appealing to liberal academic economists of the Hayek 
tradition who saw competition between national currencies as an important mechanism for 
reducing the scope for the kind of lax and divergent monetary policies that were 
observable in Europe in the mid-1970s. It also appealed to leading UK monetarists such as 
David Laidler and Michael Parkin. In an exciting two-day drafting session at Leuven nine 
of us produced the so-called All Saints Day Manifesto8 which The Economist published on 
1 November 1975 – with some reluctance, I recall. 
The Manifesto proposed to offer citizens in European inflation-prone countries the choice 
of an alternative currency of superior quality to that of their national money. More 
                                                 
5 Marjolin (1986) 
6 McDougall et al. (1977) 
7 Basevi et al. (1976), (1977) 
8 Basevi et al. (1975) 
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precisely, the constant purchasing power of the new unit – “the Europa” – was to be 
guaranteed jointly by the EEC authorities through their readiness to exchange the new unit 
at an appreciating exchange rate vis à vis the national currencies to reflect superior 
inflation performance as measured by national consumer prices indices. This could have 
put considerable pressure of high-inflation countries – whereas those who already issued 
better-quality currencies could have maintained most of their currency domains. The 
elegance of the proposal was that it appeared to require only one big decision – that of 
setting up the system and defining the rules of exchange – with the impact being left to be 
determined by the choices of the individual economic agents. It was a proposal to 
strengthen market mechanisms in the process of monetary integration and disinflation 
relative to a heavily politicised system for which most officials have a preference. 
You may wonder why I spend time of this idea today. Politically the project was a non-
starter; governments don't take decisions that imply a jump into the dark. I do so mainly 
for the reason that it brings out the schizophrenic state of mind of those who like myself 
had a strong sympathy for achieving simultaneously monetary unification in Europe and 
very low and stable inflation, the core achievement of EMU two and a half decades later. 
The Manifesto was a stark expression of the view that the former objective should help the 
realisation of the latter – and, more fundamentally, that low and stable inflation is a pre-
requisite for making monetary unification worthwhile.  
Could even this strong variant of the so-called parallel currency approach have had the 
intended effect of replacing any significant part of nationally-issued monies in Europe? 
Experience with dollarization in Latin America and the penetration of the Deutschemark in 
some countries in the Balkans suggest that there is heavy inertia in monetary habits even 
under high inflation. A direct commitment by national authorities to the penetration of the 
new unit might have made a difference; on the other hand the Manifesto proposed such a 
complex process of conversion that even to-day's refined financial markets would have had 
difficulties in developing hedging instruments based on the unit. Whatever the intellectual 
merits of the idea, one weakness was evident: the scheme was designed to advance the 
transition towards a single currency, but it said nothing about how to manage the latter 
thereafter. Once the new unit had replaced national currencies, one would be faced with 
the problem of managing a single European currency so as to continue to assure its 
constant purchasing power. A supply rule would have to replace the conversion rules of the 
transition. 
The idea of using a currency parallel to the national ones to advance monetary integration 
survived for more than a decade from the late 1970s onwards. The European Currency 
Unit (ECU) had found a niche in securities markets and in the accounts of some European 
institutions, but as an average of a number of currencies it posed little threat to national 
monetary domains. The UK government briefly revived the idea of currency competition 
in 1989 shortly before the EMU negotiations, in the shape of a proposal for a “hard ECU”. 
While simpler than the Manifesto's “Europa” it was seen, maybe not fully justified, mainly 
as a diversion coming from a country not anxious to see a single currency materialize. 
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Anyway, by that time a government-managed approach had been chosen and the 
introduction of a modest market-based element in the form of a parallel currency could not 
have added much to it. 
But let me return to reality. The one legacy of the first EMU project was the so-called 
currency snake, or joint float, of some EEC currencies which had come into existence in 
1972. The snake suffered early defections by the United Kingdom and Italy, and France 
was an intermittent participant. The arrangement became an enlarged Deutschemark zone 
with only the smaller Benelux and Nordic currencies in it. Nevertheless, the importance of 
its survival through the 1970s must not be underestimated. The grid of bilateral parities 
provided clear rules for the short term and was managed in a fairly benevolent way by the 
Bundesbank. It provided periods of exchange-rate stability that contrasted favourably with 
the experience of the currencies that were still individually floating; if anything there was 
an excessive reluctance to allow exchange rates to move on the part of the smaller 
participants. But several efforts to bring the three major European currencies of France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom into a softer variant of exchange-rate management than the 
snake failed9. 
Why then did the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) the take off in 1978? 
The force of the personalities of the two initiators, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing – and the mutual confidence between the 
two – is often singled out. Indeed, it turned out to be a unique event to have as leaders of 
Germany and France two men who combined a European ambition with the technical 
competence to see how its economic dimension could be advanced. But there were 
objective economic circumstances as well: Germany was tired of being in the frontline of 
global economic debates, asking her to become more of a locomotive in the global 
economy in the style of the 1978 Bonn Economic Summit. German labour unions and 
industry were also unhappy with the degree of exchange-rate flexibility experienced in the 
1970s: when the DEM was only tied down by links to smaller currencies, it fluctuated 
quite widely in effective-rate terms. As for France, a more stability-oriented policy after 
the departure of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in 1976 had produced initial results that 
needed more international anchoring. France presented the future system as more 
symmetric than the DEM-led snake, symbolised by having the average of the participating 
currencies, the ECU, as its central element. Such a change was technically possible, but 
unnecessarily complicated – and it would have sent a signal in conflict with what was to 
become the important rationale for the EMS: convergence towards the best behaviour with 
respect to inflation rather than the average. This French twist therefore became largely 
cosmetic. 
Was the EMS, in addition to being a practical arrangement, also – in contrast to Marjolin's 
verdict – a step towards EMU? In retrospect, it was clearly an indispensable step by 
significantly widening the group of countries prepared to regard their exchange rates as a 
matter of common concern for them and their partners. But the limitations were also 
                                                 
9 For a brief overview of these efforts, see Gros and Thygesen (1998), Ch. 2 
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obvious. On the German side this showed up in the ability of the Bundesbank to extract 
from the German government in December 1978 a promise that foreign–exchange 
interventions in the EMS would cease to be mandatory if they endangered domestic price 
stability in Germany. This so called "Emminger Letter" was a clear pointer – though at the 
time not much publicised – to the priority given by Germany to price stability over 
exchange-rate stability. 
The EMS was initially meant to develop into a second stage with a common European 
Monetary Fund to manage the consolidated credit mechanisms from the ultra–short to the 
longer–term balance-of-payments support. The two founders of the EMS did not have a 
very precise sense of the separation of the respective tasks of the monetary and the political 
authorities; short-term credits arising from mandatory foreign-exchange interventions, 
particularly when the rules are as clear as in the EMS, can safely be left to central banks, 
whereas longer-term lending for balance-of-payments adjustment require political 
decisions and some form of conditionality. The mixing of both functions in one institution 
made strong opposition from the emerging significant group of advocates of central bank 
independence inevitable10. The prospect of a regional support mechanism beyond what 
was strictly necessary for the functioning of the EMS also attracted criticism from the IMF 
for much the same reason as the plans for an Asian Monetary Fund were to do a couple of 
decades later: regional schemes were seen as undermining global monitoring and 
conditionality. Anyway, the plans for the EMF were quietly shelved in 1981 and the two 
EMS founders were soon to lose political office. 
Having had the privilege a few years later to participate in the Committee for Monetary 
Union in Europe chaired by Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d'Estaing leaves me with 
the impression that, had international circumstances and the domestic political situation in 
their respective countries permitted it, we could have seen a push for a somewhat different 
model of the EMU than the one of today – with emphasis on stronger links between the 
political and the monetary authorities. The resistance to such a project would have been 
considerable and it would have been unlikely to survive. These issues show up in the 
controversies about fiscal rules and foreign-exchange intervention in the current context to 
which I return. 
Anyway, EMU was not on the agenda in the early years of the EMS. All energy had to be 
focused on preventing the system from breaking down – as it very nearly did in 1982-83. 
Policy divergence between France and Germany flared up with the arrival of President 
Mitterrand, and a shift in the US policy mix towards tight monetary and boldly 
expansionary fiscal policies in the first Reagan Administration posed another challenge to 
European policy makers: How to respond with a mixture of depreciation and defensively 
higher interest rates? A fragmented Europe was ill placed to respond to these policy shocks 
and political tensions ran high.  
                                                 
10 See notably Pöhl (1989) 
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Despite all these fragilities there was in this period rapidly growing interest and 
encouragement from academics and officials outside Europe in the EMS. Robert Triffin 
had returned to his native Belgium from Yale and his former student Peter Kenen, along 
with Rudi Dornbusch, Alexander Swoboda and John Williamson, all took a keen interest in 
the workings and the likely impact of the emerging exchange-rate system. Due to my part-
time position as a consultant to Danmarks Nationalbank I was better informed than most 
academics about the EMS, so I was invited by Triffin to help organise a series of four 
seminars in the 1979-81 period, all leading to publications. There were also presentations 
at the IMF and the Federal Reserve Board where the tone was more critical. 
The shift in French economic policy over 1982-83 back towards more prudent 
macroeconomic policies made a qualitative change in the EMS possible. The key concept 
after March 1983 became closer convergence in inflation rates towards the lower levels of 
the best performers, notably Germany – "competitive disinflation" to use the term of some 
French policy makers. The EMS participants pursued this new line of policy at different 
speeds, particularly with respect to budgetary consolidation – Italy more slowly than 
France, and some small economies, Denmark and the Netherlands, the fastest – but an 
important common effort was visible. Targeting German inflation was becoming at the 
same time becoming more demanding – it touched zero in 1986-87 as the oil price fell. 
In 1985 the incoming Delors Commission, following up on critical studies by academic 
economists and the European Round Table of Industrialists of the growth impediments in 
the form of fragmented markets and inadequate competition, launched its ambitious 
programme for the Single Internal Market. This very detailed agenda which soon 
developed considerable political momentum involved the passage of app. 300 detailed 
pieces of legislation. It made clear that Europe aimed for a degree of integration of its 
product markets beyond a well functioning free trade area – or for that matter some Federal 
countries such as the United States. US sub-national governments retain some scope for 
internal trade and investment discrimination which the European Single Market tries to 
eliminate. Could this ambitious agenda be taken seriously if significant change in the most 
significant relative prices in Europe – intra-area exchange rates – could still be allowed? 
Hardly. 
Jacques Delors saw this linkage and tried to put monetary union already on the agenda of 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) called to discuss how to implement the Single 
Market. He was told firmly by several governments that this was a bridge too far, requiring 
negotiations in a subsequent and carefully prepared IGC; but a reference to EMU as an 
objective was inserted into the Single Act of 1986. 
An even more decisive argument supporting this objective was inherent in the Single 
Market. The latter also had the aim of decisively advancing financial integration by finally 
respecting another of the aims of the Rome Treaty: freedom for capital movements. That 
step still – far from being taken in the mid-1980s and extremely radical from the 
perspective of the first EMU project of 1970 – would make the fixed-but-adjustable system 
of exchange rates of the EMS more unstable, probably only sustainable through a degree of 
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adherence to cooperative rules unlikely to develop. Continuing with the EMS for an 
extended period as governments removed the residual capital controls – which had proved 
helpful in critical situations in the past in gaining some time for more basic adjustment – 
no longer seemed a realistic option, a view most eloquently formulated by Padoa-
Schioppa11. 
My own conviction that EMU was the alternative realistic option goes back to the late 
summer of 1985. The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels with which I 
had been associated since its start in 1981 was seeking funding from central banks and the 
private sector for a working group on how monetary cooperation could be further 
developed in the EMS and beyond. The first and crucial visit was to be Bundesbank where 
President Pöhl showed a – to me – surprising receptiveness to the argument that when 
other participants in the EMS were beginning to show performance with respect to 
inflation and interest rates broadly comparable to that of Germany – still an uncertain 
prospect by then – they could not be expected to continue to simply accept German 
leadership of the EMS, however useful that might have seemed in the past. We obtained 
the funding and Pöhl did our group the service of suggesting that one of the more 
conservative members of the Bundesbank Council could join our group. So we had a good 
rehearsal of what it would take to overcome German scepticism about moving beyond the 
EMS – and it did not seem impossible. 
Another experience gave me added confidence that EMU would happen. In 1986 the two 
EMS founders launched the Committee for Monetary Union in Europe with politicians and 
industrialists as members. You may wonder what I had to do in such group, but when I 
organised for the representatives of Schmidt and Giscard to invite two senior Danish 
politicians, not then in government, to join, neither would accept, fearing that they might 
be involved in taking positions on European issues which they found unduly adventurous. 
So I ended up as a member myself – at the cost to the Committee of influence in Denmark. 
The conviction of most of the members that EMU was becoming highly desirable, and the 
high estimates put by the industrialists to the likely cost savings of moving to a single 
currency for major European companies were useful antidotes to the analysis of most of 
professional economists. 
The CEPS group met on a number of occasions in 1986-87 and had excellent input from 
both its academic and official members. At CEPS we had the good fortune of recruiting 
Daniel Gros as Rapporteur for the Group, and I would like to use this opportunity to 
express my warm thanks to Daniel for close and, in his case, very efficient collaboration in 
this and several later stages. In retrospect, the outcome was not that sensational: a fair 
review of strengths and weaknesses of the EMS, since much elaborated in Gros and 
Thygesen (1992 and 98), and suggestions for moving towards a European System of 
Central Banks with shared responsibilities for monetary policy between the national and 
European levels. Some use was made of the analogy to the evolution of the Federal 
                                                 
11 Giavazzi, Micossi and Miller (eds.) (1988) 
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Reserve System towards more centralisation and collective decision-making, but the report 
was less than fully explicit on the time horizon for moving to a single currency12. 
The report generally had a positive reception when Daniel and I presented it in central 
banks and other fora in the early 1988, just as the debate on the creation of a European 
System of Central Banks was picking up, following initiatives by the French and Italian 
Finance Ministers and the German responses which were less critical than expected13. We 
had particularly exhaustive sessions with Bundesbank Council and with Dr. Hans 
Tietmeyer, then of the German Ministry of Finance. The German reluctance to moving 
well beyond the EMS was clearly weakening – and the decision in ECOFIN in June 1988 
to lift all remaining capital controls by 1990 removed a major argument for resisting. Once 
the EMS partners had taken the plunge of exposing themselves more fully to market 
forces, imposing more discipline and caution in monetary policy, there was a case for 
developing the joint element in policy decisions further. 
So it was no accident that the Delors Committee on EMU was set up by the European 
Council shortly after the ECOFIN decision. In the end a mixed formula for its composition 
was chosen: the then 12 national central bank governors (as personal representatives of 
their Prime Ministers), three independent experts and two members of the European 
Commission – with Jacques Delors taking the chair. Crucially, the Committee was served 
by two outstanding Secretaries, Gunter Baer and Tommasso Padoa-Schioppa. Not only did 
they prepare succinct drafts; they had also argued the main controversies out amongst 
themselves which greatly eased the adoption of the text. 
As to the three independents there could be no surprise as to two of them: Alexandre 
Lamfalussy, equally respected in the academic and central banking communities, was then 
General Manager of the Bank of International Settlements in Basel which hosted the 
monthly meetings of the Committee of Governors, while Miguel Boyer, past Finance 
Minister of the Spanish Socialist government, provided a strong link to the Spanish 
Presidency during which the group's report was to be presented. Why I was nominated, 
remained more of a mystery, though if one wanted an academic I was at the time one of the 
relatively few who had written extensively about the subject. Among the speculations I 
liked best a comment by the correspondent of Le Monde in Brussels "All we can say is that 
he is not there to slow things down". It was not because of my nationality; when the 
Danish representatives returned from the European Council they were severely criticised in 
the European Committee in our Parliament for not having done more to stop the set-up of 
the Delors Committee and my nomination to it – "he is even in favour of the project", the 
critics argued. The Prime Minister responded rather defensively that he did not know about 
it – and that it was not his idea anyway. 
                                                 
12 Gros and Thygesen (1988) 
13 It has been a regular feature that the main ideas for advancing Europe's monetary unification have come     
 from Italy and France (in that order). These ideas have then had to be tested carefully by cautious 
 German (and Dutch) officials prior to implementation. 
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The Delors Committee was a unique experience for me. The formality of the briefings that 
some governors brought to the meetings could not hide the close mutual understanding and 
trust between the national central banks governors, nurtured through monthly meetings 
over their usually many years of office. The Committee was not asked to express an 
opinion on whether EMU was desirable or not, only to answer the question put by 
governments: Assume we want to achieve EMU; what are then the means and the concrete 
stages that could lead us there? This was still a difficult question. The central bankers were 
broadly comfortable with the EMS as it existed at the time and felt they could handle the 
relationships to both their colleagues and their respective governments within it. They were 
reluctant through positive comments on EMU to implicitly criticise the system they would 
be responsible for some time yet. 
They were, above all, concerned about how governments would react to EMU – more 
likely by asserting more aggressively authority over their national budgetary policies in the 
comfortable framework without interest rate hikes and the risk of currency crises, than 
prudently, as they perceived that the ultimate recourse to inflation and devaluation would 
be ruled out. Some consoled themselves that credit risk would still be attached to national 
debt issue and would substitute to some extent for the disappearing currency risk. 
Professor Lamfalussy and his associates at the BIS reminded us of the limited extent to 
which this was happening inside large federations such as Canada and Australia where the 
differences in debt levels and their dynamics, as well as in regional per capita incomes, 
were as large (or larger) as within Europe. The maximum spreads within credible monetary 
unions were well within 100 basis points and the central bank governors did not take long 
to conclude that such spreads would not deter the governments they knew from overly 
expansionary policies. The late 1980s was a period in which relatively rapid economic 
growth did not lead to any major reduction of budget deficits –procyclical budgetary 
policies were pursued and governments were in denial of any need to consolidate. 
Although this experience of procyclical policies had not become as evident as it now 
appears it was sufficiently clearly perceived to prompt the recommendations in the Delors 
Report of "binding guidelines" in the form of upper limits to budget deficits. At bottom, 
the central bankers felt some resentment that their political counterparts were so keen on 
merging national central banks in Europe while devoting little attention to what such a step 
would require of themselves. 
The Report14 chose to focus on the final stage of EMU and the institutional features of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) rather than on the stages leading to EMU. The 
main features of the joint monetary policy were to be a primary objective of price stability 
in the medium term and independence of the members of the governing bodies of the 
ESCB of both national and European political authorities. This was not surprising in view 
of the preference of Germany for these characteristics and the perception that the German 
policy experience had been superior to those of others over the preceding decade and a 
half. The discussion of the features of the future European central banking institution also 
                                                 
14 Delors et al. (1989) 
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revealed, however, that the governors had taken to heart the thrust of macroeconomic 
literature of the 1970's and 80s on the need for time consistency in economic policy-
making as well as on the credibility of policy and the extent to which that could 
temporarily be borrowed from the Bundesbank through a firm DEM-peg.  
The main weakness of the Delors Report lay in the relative brevity and vagueness in the 
description of stages one and two on the road to full EMU (stage three). There was no 
transfer of any authority to the European level envisaged prior to the entry to stage three; 
stage one, to start on 1 July 1990 marked no change in existing practice, while stage two 
was to be characterised mainly by detailed preparations for full EMU. But could stage 
three start with no prior operational experience? Like some other members of the 
Committee I thought vagueness on the transition would undermine the process of moving 
towards EMU. But I was too much rooted in the more gradualist tradition which had 
marked the CEPS Report of 1988 and my own writings on the subject. And the more 
radical and simple approach advocated by the majority of members in the end proved 
justified: the clear design of the final stage exerted a pull on prospective candidates for full 
EMU which substituted for a well-designed transition path. The final stage was telescoped 
into the present, so sometimes "la fuite en avant" – the much maligned practice in 
European integration consisting of presenting a detailed outline of a still distant but 
reassuring future in the hope that this facilities getting there – can work. 
The vagueness of the transitional provisions was a direct consequence of the German 
insistence on the indivisibility of authority for monetary policy. Financial markets would 
be confused by any uncertainty as to who was responsible for any particular decision, so 
better leave them all in national hands until they could be fully centralised. So ran the 
argument, but it seemed a risky strategy. If there could be no transfer of decision-making 
authority in the transition to EMU, could there not be some build-up of operational 
experience in the core institution of the new system, the European Central Bank, acting as 
an agent for the participating national central banks? Professor Lamfalussy had some good 
ideas along these lines, but they, like the idea of partial transfers of authority, met with 
little favour in the Committee. 
The surprising thing was in the end not so much that the central bankers and other 
members were able to produce an outline of the main features of EMU that looked 
workable, but that the proposals rapidly developed political momentum. Some 
governments, notably that of Mrs. Thatcher, had not expected a unanimous report from the 
Delors Committee; they expected the President of the Bundesbank would either refuse to 
sign it, or raise the entry conditions to such a level that others would give up. But the 
concessions to the German monetary policy strategy had been quite sufficient to make such 
outcomes unlikely. Although the Bundesbank was going to lose its leadership role in the 
EMS, the prospect of obtaining commitments to a stability-oriented monetary policy 
throughout the participating countries broadly compensated for that. To other central 
bankers signing was more obvious; for the non-German central banks the process offered 
earlier transition to independence than would otherwise have been possible. 
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The Report was endorsed as a working basis in the European Council in Madrid and after a 
brief review of the proposals by the national Finance Ministries in the following months 
the ground had been sufficiently prepared for calling an Intergovernmental Conference to 
discuss EMU. This procedure had – due to the skilful drafting by Wim Duisenberg - been 
outlined at the end of the Delors Report. There is therefore every indication that an IGC 
would have been convened not too long thereafter, although German public opinion was 
showing some reticence. The dramatic political events in Central and Eastern Europe, with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 as a climax, had been totally unforeseen. 
These events advanced the calling of the IGC by increasing the pressure on Germany to 
start in return for the support of her partners for unification and the concession to Germany 
of convening a parallel conference on political union. 
The Maastricht Treaty, finalised in the course of 1991, followed in most important respects 
quite closely the proposals in the Delors Report. The central bank governors submitted 
Draft Statutes for the ESCB with a number of useful additional details and the essential 
advance of the acceptance of the "one-man-one-vote" principle in the Governing Council 
of the new central bank - the only application of this principle in the European institutions, 
made possible by the clear mandate for the joint monetary policy. A timetable for stages 
one and two and the set-up of a special institution from the start of stage two – the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI) – to prepare in detail for the final stage was agreed. 
Alexandre Lamfalussy was later put in charge of leading the EMI, making sure that 
nothing would have to be improvised at the start of the final stage. But one essential 
weakness in the transition remained. 
The Delors Report had been extremely cautious about how to move from one stage to the 
next; in principle all countries should be ready. This would in practice present no problems 
prior to the start of stage three, but that transition might well be blocked indefinitely by the 
slowest member(s). The draft of the Maastricht Treaty prepared by the Dutch Presidency 
stipulated that stage three could start on 1 July 1997 if a majority of member states were 
ready and it was  deemed “appropriate” to enter; if not, a similar effort to start should be 
made at 2-year intervals thereafter. This was an open-ended procedure that might have 
lasted indefinitely; the pressure on prospective candidates to get ready soon would 
certainly diminish. The attraction of the final stage would be undermined by the absence of 
a firm timetable. 
In a meeting of the Schmidt-Giscard Committee in November 1991 this prospect caused 
alarm and it was decided to make a last-ditch effort to formulate a procedure that would 
provide a degree of automaticity in the transition. High-powered members from the three 
largest continental countries and the Netherlands and Belgium pushed this idea with their 
respective governments. The proposal surfaced through the Italian government, but with 
crucial support from the political leaders of Germany and France. Hence the final text of 
the Maastricht Treaty stipulates (Art. 109 j 4) that, if a majority of states were not 
economically ready, i.e. did not fulfil the convergence criteria, full EMU would start 
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automatically on 1 January 1999 with whatever number of states met the criteria. 
Prescription had prevailed over pragmatism. 
This turned out to be a crucial provision; without it EMU would probably still be on the 
drawing board. I recall it as a critical moment also in Denmark's relations to EMU. I was in 
no position to influence decision-makers here; when I told officials in Copenhagen about 
the efforts to put the automaticity provision into the Treaty the reaction was that Denmark 
would have to insist on the right to opt into stage three only later, since there had been no 
political preparations for the eventuality of this kind of automatic entry. This reservation 
subsequently made it possible for Denmark to decide after the Maastricht Treaty had failed 
in a referendum that we wanted to exercise the option not to join prematurely, i.e. already 
by 1992-93. This was the so-called "National Compromise" – between those who did not 
want EMU to happen and those who thought it was unlikely to happen and hence costless 
to opt out of. Time has undermined both of these positions, but Denmark has fortunately 
minimised the costs of staying out by pursuing a particularly orthodox version of the 
policies required in EMU. 
There was to be a long way from the signing of the EMU Treaty to realisation. The 
ratification process ran into major difficulties, not only in Denmark, but also in France, 
Germany and Britain. On top of that, and partly as a consequence, the EMS lived through 
major crises in 1992-93. 
Political leaders had moved well beyond public opinion in their push for EMU. My 
participation in campaigns prior to the Danish and French referenda provided striking 
illustrations of the extent to which governments had difficulties in communicating the 
message of EMU to their electorate. In Denmark voters were not very interested in the 
Treaty, may be understandably since we had already at Maastricht obtained a reservation 
enabling us to defer a decision on entry. Just to be sure a majority of voters nevertheless 
voted the Treaty down. In France the referendum was narrowly won, but the arguments 
used by the government, and particularly by President Mitterrand, bore little relationship to 
the provisions of the Treaty. The emphasis in the campaign was heavily on reducing the 
German influence in monetary policy with little recognition of the constructive role that 
influence had played in the past, and on visions for economic governance in EMU which 
still have not been developed and probably never will be. Central bank independence did 
not come naturally to French policy-makers.  
The first wave of EMS crises came in September 1992 shortly before the French 
referendum. At this time coordination efforts within the EMS had visibly reached their 
limits. German unification with overheating and massive demands on public finances had 
obliged the Bundesbank to raise interest rates to levels that partner countries found 
objectionable as they were entering an economic slowdown. Requests for lower German 
rates were met by not unreasonable German requests for devaluations of a few partner 
currencies. When that was finally offered, initially only from the Italian side, it was too 
little, too late. Speculative attacks forced the lira and sterling off their rates and pushed the 
Iberian currencies into significant realignments. After almost one year of turbulence, 
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affecting also occasionally currencies with sound fundamentals, the ECOFIN Council on 1 
August 1993 widened the margins in the bilateral grid to ±15% while maintaining the 
central rates themselves. 
Interpretations of the significance of this step vary widely. Some, notably the British, saw 
the partial suspension of the EMS as a definite sign that the whole EMU project had now 
become unfeasible. If the participants could not even sustain a fairly loose system, how 
could they ever hope to get to full EMU with its far more demanding constraints, was the 
question heard often – and not only in Britain where Prime Minister John Major began to 
describe the EMU project as a “rain dance”. The role of the EMS as a stepping stone to 
EMU had become so well established in the perception of most observers that there was a 
sense of loss of direction when it was suddenly undermined.  
But there is another interpretation. The morning after the widening of margins I had a call 
from Daniel Gros who said: I am writing an article under the title “The EMS is dead, long 
live EMU” – do you want to be in? I was not quite there yet, but in retrospect the 
inference, developed most authoritatively by Padoa-Schioppa15, is surely correct: the 
speculative attacks had made it necessary for the EMS participants to step back a moment 
to demonstrate that the exchange-rate structure of the EMS was a durable one, not only 
underpinned by rules of intervention, but also by underlying convergence of inflation rates 
and increasing real economic cohesion. Running a fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate 
system had become an impediment to achieving EMU, because differences in cyclical 
position and responses to them were blown out of proportion by financial markets.  
It may be useful to reflect on how the divergence of German unification might have 
unfolded if EMU had already been in existence from say, 1991. With monetary policy 
determined by the average economic conditions throughout EMU, interest rates would 
have been lower everywhere, but particularly outside Germany, where, in the EMS they 
had to incorporate a currency risk premium. Inflation would probably have been a bit 
higher and the slowdown of output in the recession of the early 1990 less pronounced. 
Whether EMU would have been the optimal regime for handling a major asymmetric 
shock such as German unification remains an open issue, but it would have been superior 
to the relatively rigid EMS which had developed by then. 
The crucial test of the willingness to proceed towards EMU came in the first year after the 
widening of margins. Would participants make use of the higher degree of exchange-rate 
flexibility to individually pursue more aggressive policies in order to escape faster from 
recession? This line was recommended by the IMF and by many academic economists. 
Fortunately, the wider margins were not used much used. Budget consolidation began and 
accelerated in 1995-97. 
Over this period it became clear that participation in an EMU that could now only start in 
1999 might not be limited to the at most six countries that were initially singled out as the 
likely maximum number: Germany, France, the three Benelux countries (though with some 
                                                 
15 Padoa-Schioppa (1994) 
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misgivings about Belgium due to her record-high debt ratio) and Austria. Finland was 
recovering fast from deep recession and Ireland had become by far the best performing 
economy of Europe. Most remarkably, the two Iberian countries and Italy decided in 1996 
to make a major effort to join the first group. They had the most at stake, since 
convergence of interest rates towards the benchmarks in low-inflation national markets 
would confer great benefits and provide a major contribution to the budgetary 
consolidation required for entry into full EMU. This was particularly true for Italy with the 
highest debt ratio and the largest interest-rate differential. Yet Italy remained the most 
hesitant; on becoming Prime Minister Romano Prodi initially said he would not want to 
carry a dying Italian economy into EMU. He was persuaded by then Finance Minister 
Ciampi and other advisers to avoid being left behind as the only country not making a 
major effort to join. In fact the Italian economy was in much better shape a couple of years 
later, mostly as a result of the “sacrifices” made in preparation for EMU, including the so-
called Euro tax, a politically courageous initiative which probably could not have been 
taken in any other European country. 
The likelihood of wider participation evoked mixed reactions. While the French Socialists 
saw participation by the three “Club Med” countries as an essential counterweight to 
supposedly more conservative policy-making in most other countries, the German 
government proposed the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which put more teeth into the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty - an open-ended procedure with 
financial sanctions against clearly divergent behaviour at the end, but with escape clauses 
and a long time horizon for completing the process. The three main contributions of the 
SGP were to provide a tight timetable for assessing budgetary behaviour, a rigorous 
definition of the “exceptional” circumstances that would remove the threat of sanctions, 
and to introduce the cyclically-adjusted budget balance as a monitoring device. A fourth 
element proposed by Germany was only approximately met: automaticity in applying the 
sanctions procedures. The Germans consoled themselves and their concerned public 
opinion that their partners had virtually pre-committed themselves to voting in favour of 
sanctions once they were presented with a clear case of violation. We now know they 
overinterpreted these provisions. But it is important to recall that the SGP was generally 
welcomed; most governments recognised the need for a set of fiscal rules that was more 
than a trigger for discussion, in short more rules than procedure. 
In the end EMU came into existence with no less than 11 participants in the first group on 
the basis of economic performance in 1997. The European Central Bank opened in June 
1998 with a highly competent Board under the presidency of Wim Duisenberg and an 
agenda that had been meticulously prepared by the EMI under the leadership of Alexandre 
Lamfalussy since the beginning of 1994. The ECB Governing Council clarified its 
monetary strategy in October, relying, not surprisingly, on a mixture of monetary and other 
guides to future inflation and the Council chose as its operational definition of price 
stability in the medium-term an inflation rate (of harmonised consumer prices) of less than 
2%. Both of these features were largely anticipated and in line with what was considered 
best practice at that time, so they did not create much controversy. Interest rates converged 
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towards the low levels in Germany in the run up to 1 January 1999 when the participating 
currencies were locked irreversibly to the Euro. 
 
EMU after six years – was it worth the trouble? 
 Let me address the question first, because an answer to that has to sum up the 
benefits and the costs of the long process leading up to 1999. It will already be evident 
from my lengthy account that I regard EMU and the single currency as significant progress 
not only from the systemic viewpoint of monetary integration but also from the perspective 
of individual participants. Complaints have simply been rare, because there were no major 
costs in terms of output losses in the run up to EMU.  
Some of the countries that experienced particularly rapid convergence of interest rates to 
low levels – Italy, Spain, Portugal, later Greece – have since complained that this positive 
disturbance overwhelmed their policy-makers in the next few years, creating temporary 
overheating and that, in general, the behaviour of their firms and unions had not fully 
adjusted to the tougher environment of a monetary union where the escape route of 
inflation and depreciation had been blocked. It is obvious that they should have 
consolidated their public finances anyway – and that they could have done even more. A 
significant part of German opinion still feels that the combination of the fiscal burdens of 
unification and of the appreciation of the DEM over the 6-7 years prior to EMU hung a 
millstone round the neck of the German economy in the new regime. However, the 
relatively good external performance of Germany during the recent period suggests that the 
problems are primarily domestic. At the same time the imbalances inside Germany which 
the massive transfers to the East have tried to relieve could hardly have been addressed 
better in a regime of some exchange-rate flexibility and the (slightly) lower interest rates 
that specific German conditions would then have indicated. 
Was EMU really necessary for achieving low and stable inflation? Do not some European 
countries with the experience of individually floating currencies suggest that inflation 
targeting can provide results fully comparable to those of the EMU participants? It is 
undeniable that Sweden and the United Kingdom have developed well-functioning policy 
frameworks and stable low inflation outside EMU. For both currencies there has been 
some volatility and significant longer-run swings in their Euro exchange rate while the 
difference in behaviour of effective exchange rates is modest. But would we have seen as 
determined efforts to develop a monetary framework without the competition from the 
process of monetary unification in Europe? Both Sweden and the United Kingdom initially 
developed their inflation targeting as a second best, after they had been ejected from the 
EMS by market pressures and, as they refined their systems, they were under pressure to 
be at least as determined and clear as the framework that was emerging for the joint 
monetary policy in EMU. British Eurosceptic friends sometimes tell me that competition in 
monetary arrangements is a good thing and that the EMU participants should consider 
themselves lucky to have high-quality competition from the UK monetary framework. But 
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surely competitive forces working in the opposite direction have been at least as powerful. 
The tail still does not wag the dog. 
The EMU participants are familiar with competition among monetary frameworks and 
policies. The EMS was all about that – and as a result the participants chose to move to 
EMU because they found that they could not preserve the degree of nominal exchange-rate 
stability vis-à-vis other European economies that they desired, since moderate differences 
in economic policy were interpreted in an exaggerated way in financial markets. If one 
tries to imagine the counterfactual scenario that EMU had not had the automaticity 
provision for its start on 1 January 1999 already referred to, but had been postponed to an 
“appropriate” time, it seems likely that we would still have the national currencies linked 
together by the wider-margins EMS, known as ERM 2. Currency movements would have 
been substantial as financial markets reacted to such events as demonstrations against 
reforms in Germany, the announcement (though not yet implementation) of underfinanced 
tax cuts in Italy and major revisions to public sector finances in Portugal and Greece – as 
well as to national debates on the appropriateness of a largely common monetary policy. 
One must not overlook the usefulness of having put all these diversions behind.  
Some critics of EMU, not least among British and American economists felt that the 
prolonged effort of monetary unification over most of the 1990s was becoming a 
distraction. As on some other topics, possibly the sharpest formulation of this position is 
due to Larry Summers, then Deputy Treasury Secretary who said (in 1997) that Europe 
faced the paradox that 
“EMU's success depends on finding strategies to address these 
challenges (of slow growth of output and employment, NT) but 
that EMU itself does not directly address them. If the process 
surrounding monetary union distracts Europe from some of its 
economic and structural challenges, then it will carry an 
opportunity cost in terms of economic growth foregone.”16
This analysis has some of truth in it, but it still seems to me unfair to the European efforts 
of the 1990s. Moving towards a more growth-friendly policy mix, combining low interest 
rates and budgetary consolidation was a major achievement of this period – as was the 
largely parallel effort in the United States during the Clinton era. The US economy 
responded more vigorously to the more growth-fiendly macroeconomic policy mix without 
having to add in structural reforms to advance labour market flexibility, privatisation and 
deregulation and improve the financing of innovation – the challenges that Summers had in 
mind for Europe. All these elements were largely in place in the United States; in Europe 
they only began to be clearly identified through several different policy “processes” 
launched in the course of the 1990s. Since these policies remain largely a national 
responsibility in the present EU – and will continue in that mode once the Draft 
                                                 
16 Summers (1997) 
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Constitutional Treaty is ratified – it takes time to implement policies in a way that 
significantly affects aggregate behaviour in the Euro area. 
There is a message in the analysis of Summers of greater relevance today than 7-8 years 
ago. We can no longer afford to let discussions about EMU itself distract the policy debate. 
Monetary policy more narrowly may at best help to narrow the fluctuations of output 
around its trend rate of growth (potential output), but it cannot hope to have any impact 
directly on the latter. Both actual and potential outputs have slowed in recent years, settling 
down to a rate of growth of less than 2% annually in the last few years. Therefore the slow 
growth in output since 2001 has not opened up a major output gap, and hence considerable 
scope for macroeconomic stimulus. Many economists are puzzled by this sluggishness; 
some attribute it to over-conservative measurement of potential output, others see a spill-
over from slow growth of demand to the economy's potential; the longer the duration of 
high unemployment and the share of long-term unemployment therein, the more difficult it 
is to maintain growth in the human capital embodied in the labour force. 
While this analysis of so-called “persistence” in Europe labour markets by Blanchard and 
co-authors no doubt has a point, I wonder whether the reverse causation –  from the growth 
of potential output  to actual output – is not more significant. It can be based on the 
permanent-income model of consumption and saving; if perceptions of the likely course of 
income over, say, the next decade are lowered relative to the past consumption today will 
be dampened significantly. In the late 1990s the assumption generally accepted was that 
the Euro area economies in the aggregate had a potential annual growth rate of about 3%. 
But since 2001 the actual growth rate has averaged little more than 1%. If that is seen as 
continuing a bit longer, it is not surprising that consumption is sluggish and disappointing. 
This structural, or supply-based, explanation of weak consumer demand – obviously with 
an impact on investment – in Europe is the core of the analysis in the recent reports from 
the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group17. The policy implication is that the need in the 
Euro area is not for more macroeconomic stimuli, but for structural reforms that can 
visibly raise the speed limit of the participating economies – by increasing participation 
rates in the labour market and by raising productivity. 
The contrast to the United States is once more illuminating. From about 1995 both output 
per hour worked and so-called total factor productivity in the US economy shifted up by 
nearly one percentage point. This shift was correctly – and to his great credit – identified 
early by Chairman Greenspan and his staff as having widened the scope for expansionary 
monetary policy. Demand rose sharply over the following five years, indeed even faster 
than simply, as households and firms borrowed heavily on the prospect of higher 
permanent income, exceeding the productive capacity of the US economy over the 
subsequent boom years. Our Director of Country Studies at the OECD, Val Koromzay, has 
coined an appropriate term for these interactions between longer-term supply and the 
shorter-term demand: Super-Say's Law. As economists will recall, Jean-Baptiste Say's 
main legacy to macroeconomic theory is that an increase in supply creates its own demand. 
                                                 
17 See in particular Gros et al. (2003), Ch. 1 
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Super-Say's Law states that a positive supply shock such as that observed to US 
productivity from 1995 temporarily creates excess demand; as economic agents telescope 
their future expected earnings into present spending even the rapidly rising productive 
capacity is not sufficient to meet demand. 
While a less clear example in the opposite direction, the slowdown in both potential and 
actual output in the Euro area since 2001 can also usefully be thought of in this framework. 
The US economy had a sharp cyclical slowdown after the long boom up to 2000, but 
productivity growth has, at least until now, survived broadly intact. In Europe there has 
been a weaker cyclical slowdown, but a further and apparently more significant depressing 
effect on demand from an increasingly visible and durable slowdown in the growth of 
productive capacity. Permanent income has fallen sufficiently to open up a negative output 
gap even with the slow-down in potential output growth. 
I go into this important issue, even though I started out arguing the monetary policy cannot 
hope to have an impact on the underlying or potential growth rate and therefore should not 
take the blame for unsatisfactory performance. Some European policy-makers and 
economists still seem to have some hope that it could and the US experience apparently 
gives them a benchmark for criticising the joint monetary policy conducted by the ECB. 
Why not be more activist and push the use of potential output to the full? Quite apart from 
the fact that the Fed has a different and broader mandate for monetary policy than the 
ECB, Chairman Greenspan has, as already noted, had a more responsive economy to work 
with18. It is not that the ECB has not been looking eagerly for signs of a pick-up in 
productivity growth, or just evidence of a stop to its downward trend, that could improve 
the output-inflation trade-off and hence create more scope for monetary expansion. Such 
signs have so far been insufficiently widespread to influence policy-making at the ECB. So 
Larry Summers was right to ask: when is the Euro area going to address the issues that are 
even more important than monetary unification? European policy-makers will respond that 
this is happening with the Lisbon Agenda, but so far the gap between the up-beat rhetorics 
and reality has in itself put the spotlight on the negative shock of recent years, amplifying 
its impact on demand. Discussing this more fully would, however, take me well beyond 
even today's broad topic. 
As far as monetary policy is concerned more narrowly the EMU participants have had very 
much what was promised: a single currency with a record of price stability that we should 
not want much different. We are very close to 2% average inflation of harmonised 
consumer prices for the first six years and nearly all observations are in the 1-3% interval. 
There was initially some confusion among outsiders as to whether the target was well 
below 2%, but the comprehensive Strategy Review of May 2003 put that to rest by 
clarifying that the target was ideally just below 2%. It remains a mystery to me why the 
ECB continues to leave itself open to the sniping from financial journalists and non-Euro 
area central banks that the target is not symmetrical around 2% when it looks so much like 
                                                 
18 In the so-called Euro 50 Group chaired by Edmond Alphandéry we have devoted some attention to     
 comparisons between the Fed and the ECB. 
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that. The monetary pillar has been another source of criticism for lack of clarity of 
communication, but here again the Strategy Review helped. My own view, influenced by 
my CEPS colleague Thomas Mayer of Deutsche Bank, is that the ECB may well be 
groping usefully towards a more refined strategy than pure inflation targeting (or inflation 
expectations targeting, as is the more accurate term), and that the current, less prominent, 
role of the monetary pillar is a useful handle for that by extending the time horizon and 
permitting a closer look at elements of financial stability. There is, in my view 
appropriately, a less rejectionist view of the need to monitor risks to financial stability in 
general and the role of asset prices in particular than one finds in the Fed or in some of the 
inflation-targeting banks elsewhere19. 
At the more technical level one has to recognise how well the decision-making bodies 
seem to operate, the openness of the Euro system to interaction with outsiders, including 
academics and last, but arguably most impressively of all, the highly efficient introduction 
of Euro notes and coins nearly three years ago. A few words, on each of the first two of 
these points. 
During the EMU discussion there were fears expressed that the ECB Governing Council 
would find it difficult to operate as a cohesive body. It has clearly become that and I find 
no hard evidence so far that its size or composition – with the six Executive Board 
members in a potentially worrisome position of a small minority in a Council of 18 – has 
significantly hampered or delayed decision-making. And we have no recent record at all of 
any public expression by a Council member of dissent. In short, the initial fears of 
excessive fragmentation in the Eurosystem seem to have been exaggerated. But I am 
concerned about the overload of members in the Council that will follow the entry of many 
new EU member states into EMU over the 2007-10 period. There should have been a 
lower cap on voting membership in the Council or, better, more delegation of decision- 
making to the Executive Board20. 
As regards openness my own limited experience as a member of the Academic Panel 
which prepares the quarterly hearings in the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of 
the European  Parliament with the ECB President and as a regular participant in the annual 
conference of "ECB Watchers" in Frankfurt, convened by Axel Weber until he became 
part of the decision-making himself as President of the Bundesbank, leads me to believe 
that the whole Eurosystem has become very open to dialogue and by now explains its 
strategy and individual actions as well as its broad interested audience has the right to 
expect. The earlier criticism of ECB communication has died down; I always felt that this 
criticism was under the wrong heading as it tended to come primarily from those who 
disagreed with the policy while they understood it quite well. Let me now turn to the steps 
taken in the Maastricht Treaty to safeguard the focus of monetary policy on the 
maintenance of medium-term price stability. 
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20 This is argued i.a. in Gros et al. (2002), Ch. 3 
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Some additional challenges not yet resolved 
When the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated efforts understandably focused on protecting 
the independence of the ECB, in part by constraining its own mandate, in part by removing 
as much as possible the risk that its freedom of manoeuvre would be undermined by other 
actors. I deal first with the two main examples of the latter: the fiscal rules designed to 
underpin EMU, and the weakness and ambiguity of the political authority in influencing 
the external value of the Euro. Both are now under strain and need some re-evaluation. 
As already noted, the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) was incorporated into the 
Maastricht Treaty to contain divergence in budgetary developments in individual 
participating countries. Although some long-term constraints are tighter in a monetary 
union as the ultimate escape route of inflation and devaluation out of a lack of 
sustainability of public finances, the “deficit bias”, inherent in the short-term horizon of 
policy-makers, is strengthened when a country enters EMU. So, when the market sanctions 
of higher national interest rates and pressures on the currency fade away, the Finance 
Ministers from partner countries who take over the main role in monitoring a country's 
public finances need a minimum of rules to exercise a peer review effectively. This 
remains the decisive argument against scrapping the "binding guidelines" to the ceiling 
which the Delors Report had advocated. If anything, the argument has strengthened since 
EMU started, since financial markets exercise even less discipline over public finances 
then anticipated. Instead of the 100 basis points that were envisaged in the Delors 
Committee discussion in the late 1980s, the current maximum differential is in the order of 
20 basis points. Credit risk premia have barely - within the present range of national 
budgetary experience – taken over any of the role earlier assumed by currency risk. 
Financial markets have come to regard national debt issued by different countries in EMU 
and at different speeds – sometimes even with different credit ratings – as close substitutes. 
That is in itself a strong vote of confidence in EMU, but it does increase the risk of 
national fiscal behaviour which is in a medium-term perspective unsustainable. 
What are the main criteria to be kept in mind in designing the minimal fiscal rule required 
in these comforting circumstances? The rule should be as unambiguous as possible to 
facilitate monitoring and ultimately enforcement. It should help national governments to 
prevent public finances from entering unsustainable territory, while leaving some room for 
stabilisation policy, primarily though  the operation of automatic stabilisers which in most 
European countries are fairly strong relatively to elsewhere in the OECD area. 
If these criteria are broadly acceptable, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a serious 
effort to embody them was made in the original design of the EDP. The 3% ceiling is, if 
anything, transparent and should be easy to monitor, even though revisions to figures have 
at times been painfully large. Indeed, recent experience has shown that it is very useful to 
have a well-defined numerical commitment, since that gives a handle on the national 
public accounts figures. It will never be possible to replicate in Eurostat the detailed 
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knowledge of public accounts found in national Ministries of Finance, but with time one 
can surely do much better than until now in monitoring21. 
Basing the EDP on actual deficits will imply that insistence on the 3% rule has procyclical 
effects, if a country has not been prudent in building up a margin in good times well below 
the ceiling. This is the core of the problem that has emerged since 2002: should earlier 
somewhat procyclical expansionary policies now be paid for by procyclical policies in the 
opposite direction? The SGP already recommended monitoring movements in the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit and established the principle that countries should aim for 
balance or small surplus. Taken literally, this principle implies a much faster decline in the 
debt ratio than the original EDP, indeed convergence towards zero in the long run. Is this 
reasonable and, in particular, does it require individual differentiation with more lenient 
treatment of countries that have a debt ratio well below the reference value of 60% of 
GDP? It might, but such a modification would not soften the pressure on most of those 
presently in violation of the rules. Germany and France who have both been above 3% 
deficits in 2002-2004 have debt ratios well above 60% and rising, while Greece and Italy 
are still above 100%. 
There is a more serious problem in basing the monitoring primarily on the cyclically-
adjusted deficit. While analytically appealing, problems of transparency are compromised; 
cyclically-adjusted balances are much harder to measure. Governments remain accountable 
for their actual deficits, but they will continue to argue at great length about their structural 
deficits, even as a common methodology is emerging. Pressures to upgrade these more 
refined measures of imbalances may be abating anyway, as countries increasingly have to 
face up to the reality that most of their deficits are of a structural nature – 75-80% 
according to the latest estimates. This is just another way of saying that output gaps 
remains fairly modest, as already argued. 
Assuming that one can measure correctly the cyclically-adjusted balance, is it over- 
ambitious to aim for it to be zero? For the short-term purpose of the cohesiveness of the 
Euro area it might be enough to direct this advice only to those with debt above the long- 
term norm. Although that is where the legitimacy for fiscal rules in EMU originated, these 
rules have in recent years taken on a clearer long-term dimension. Ideally, they should help 
to bolster long-term sustainability of public finances while giving some allowance for 
flexible responses to shorter-term disturbances, mainly, but not necessarily exclusively, 
through automatic stabilisers. It is a widespread public perception, encouraged by many 
political statements, that the rules have provided a straitjacket which has seriously 
jeopardised an effective stabilisation policy in the recent period. This seems a distorted 
view of reality; despite their apparent rigour of the rules they have been applied so flexibly 
that longer-run sustainability has become even more strained. 
                                                 
21 An alternative improvement in the reliability of national public sector deficits would be to have independent 
   experts at the national level evaluate the figures, particularly ex ante, as advocated by a number of   
    academic economists. 
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There are two elements in this reasoning. The first, several, if not most, of the 
governments in the Euro area have a degree of confidence in the stabilising properties of 
their budgetary policies which seems excessive. Second, even if there remains some 
modest encouragement of demand to be gained from well-designed tax cuts and possibly 
expenditure increases, longer-term sustainability has become such an important issue that 
the stimulus may have to be reversed shortly. Let me elaborate briefly. 
On the first point, recent empirical research by academic economists, the Commission and 
the OECD22, suggests that lower public saving through a larger deficit tends to be partially 
offset – on average at least to the extent of one half – by higher private saving and that this 
offset is strongly path-dependent, i.e. the larger the initial deficit, the larger the offset. 
Given this non-linearity the offset may well become nearly complete if the deficit is 
already large and much critical attention is focussed on it. A recent supplementary 
illustration is provided by opinion polls of household attitudes to additional consumer 
spending following the tax cuts announced in Germany and advanced in 2003-04; only a 
tiny proportion of households expected to spend the additional disposable income. While 
all Euro area countries may still be some distance from budgetary positions where it could 
be argued that contractionary policies would have net expansionary effects – not least 
because the impact via lower interest rates could only be marginal in the present context – 
it is a surprise that governments continue to emphasise the negative impact of consolida-
tion on demand at the expense of its longer-run benefits. Stabilisation policy is being 
oversold. 
On the second point, long-term projections of public finances in the Euro area over the 
next 3-4 decades suggest a clear absence of sustainability in several countries, barring 
major revisions of policy. These projections, based on foreseeable demographics, pension 
entitlements and a well-established tendency for the demand for publicly–provided health 
services to grow faster than incomes, are, of course, well-known to policy-makers and 
they have been analysed in a comparative perspective by the Commission and by other 
international institutions – although no agreed common methodology has as yet been 
developed. Early steps in pension reforms, notably by weakening incentives for early 
retirement, have been taken, even in France and Germany. But the public understanding of 
the urgency of such steps remains very limited, as long-term imbalances in public finances 
are difficult to communicate to the electorate. So the main parameters that drive the future 
public sector imbalances are subject to only very slow modifications. Hence the need to 
improve the current stance of fiscal policy is impossible to escape. 
At the OECD where we are under no obligation to defend the fiscal rules of EMU – our 
many non-Euro area members would not agree – we are convinced of their rationale. I 
quote from the most recent OECD Survey of the Euro area (September 2004):  
                                                 
22 See i.a. Gali and Perotti (2003), Commission (2003) and OECD (2004). 
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“More fundamentally, and even on an optimistic assessment 
of the fiscal impact of population ageing, the close to 
balance or in surplus rule (for cyclically-adjusted balances. 
NT) is the minimum required in the next two decades to 
underpin fiscal sustainability beyond this horizon.” 
This is not just advice for Italy or Greece, but also for France and Germany which have 
unsustainability problems of alarming proportions, as is spelled out in some detail in their 
country reviews. 
It is a major disappointment that the governments of the largest European economies have 
chosen to delay their much needed consolidation while launching an outright attack on the 
fiscal rules in EMU. Instead of confrontation they could, if they found it too painful to try 
to convince their electorate of a programme of consolidation coupled with structural 
reform, have accepted the initially modest sanctions of the SGP, hence preserving the 
framework of the enforcement of any future fiscal rule vis-á-vis present or future EMU-
countries. 
Let me avoid too pessimistic a twist to this discussion of the fiscal rules for underpinning 
EMU in a longer-run perspective. Member states are behaving more responsibly than in 
earlier decades when fiscal policy was quite often procyclical, most recently in the late 
1980s. The Euro area also comes out better than the United States or Japan, though that 
offers little grounds for congratulation. Even without sanctions the 3% ceiling no doubt has 
some deterrent effects and Finance Ministers continue to refer to it in the respective 
domestic debates. And we may be coming to the end of the transgressions by the largest 
member states anyway. France and Germany have recently presented Stability Program-
mes for 2005 with actual deficits just under 3%. Hopefully, they are right. Also very 
important is the cautious reaction to the catalogue of possibilities for making the fiscal 
rules more flexible. The most far-fetched one of exempting major categories of 
expenditures from the deficit calculation seems to have stalled as different governments 
presented different ideas for what expenditures – all public investment, R & D 
expenditures, budgeting contributions to the EU, military expenditures and some other 
variants – to exclude. The idea of basing future monitoring more on ex ante magnitudes 
and less on ex post performances appears to have limited support. Governments have 
systematically been too optimistic in forecasting their fiscal situation and an explicit shift 
would give them added incentives to continue; basically they will have to assume full 
responsibility for their forecasts. The proposal, also in the Commission catalogue, to 
extend the “exceptional circumstances” in which sanctions can not be applied to “periods 
of prolonged slow growth”, clearly appeals to several governments, but it would be so 
wide-ranging an exception that it should be resisted. 
The ideal outcome would be of the governments of the EMU participants individually 
adopted rules to assure the sustainability of their public finances including specification of 
policy reforms modifying the parameters that underlie the future increasing strains on 
public finances. But until such intelligent long-term versions of balanced budget 
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amendments have appeared, the admittedly simple and somewhat arbitrary fiscal rules in 
EMU should not be discarded but rather emphasised. 
The second area where further reflection is required after some years with EMU is that of 
external relations for the Euro area, in particular the role of the exchange rate of the Euro. 
The Maastricht Treaty reflects the view that since the joint monetary policy is to be guided 
by medium-term price stability as its primary objective, there can be no systematic 
exchange-rate policy for the Euro. The decision-making surrounding this area has been 
criticised for ambiguity, but it is in my view reasonably clear: the ECB would have the 
decisive word. The circumstances under which politicians would be in a position to take 
outright decisions regarding the exchange rate are so exceptional – unanimity in ECOFIN 
on “formal agreements” with non-EMU countries on an exchange-rate system, that this 
looked highly unlikely. Closer to the realm of the possible is the prospect of finding a 
qualified majority of Finance Ministers ready to agree on “general orientations” for 
exchange rate policy vis-à-vis particular foreign currencies without any formal agreements. 
But any such orientations would have to follow consultations with the ECB and be 
“without prejudice to the primary objective to maintain price stability”. The cards were 
clearly stacked against political influence in this area to safeguard the independence of the 
new central bank.  
Against this background it should come as no surprise that, despite major swings in the 
EUR-USD rate – a reduction of the value of the euro by nearly one third between the start 
of EMU and late 2000 and a strengthening of the euro by more than half from then until 
today – no agreement in the Eurogroup has emerged on “general orientations”. As the Euro 
dropped towards its low of 83 US cents in the autumn of 2000 a common understanding 
developed between the Eurogroup and the ECB that further depreciation not only added to 
inflation but was also becoming an embarrassment for everyone with some responsibility 
for EMU. So there were brief intervention episodes, in September with some other G7 
central banks, in early November with the ECB acting alone. Currency relationships then 
stabilised and after a year and a half of some volatility but no trend the Euro started a long 
recovery. There is once more talk of intervention to check a further rise – which is the 
immediate reason why we have lost my oldest central bank friend Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa as a speaker in this conference. 
However, this time there is more likely to be disagreement between the political and the 
monetary authorities in Europe as to the proper course of action than was the case four 
years earlier. The sensitivity of the politicians to euro appreciation is somewhat greater 
than of the ECB. Appreciation creates serious concern in some European industries, but it 
does help the ECB to keep inflation near 2% without raising interest rates. Would it serve a 
purpose to intervene? I doubt it, not because I belong to the large group of economists who 
attribute no significant effects to intervention; indeed when carried out at the right time it is 
likely to temporarily reverse or at least halt currency movements – even when done 
unilaterally. The Japanese experience in recent years is moderately encouraging with 
respect to the effects of interventions. I also agree with Paul de Grauwe that we have the 
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means in Europe for supporting the dollar in a massive way – if we want to.  Given the 
imbalances in the market, support could well have to be massive, somewhat on the 
Japanese scale. But there is a contrast to the situation in Japan which was marked by (mild) 
deflation and a search for assets that could be bought to create money. Dollar assets came 
in handy in this context. All of that is quite different in the Euro area where inflation is 
more or less on target, liquidity is ample banks are healthily profitable and asset prices are 
not depressed or still declining. 
More fundamentally, further dollar depreciation is an inescapable part of the adjustment, 
even when other major currencies in Asia relieve a bit of the burden on the euro by 
allowing their currencies to rise against the USD. The United States has to curtail its 
budget deficit and go through a period of slower growth, but it is not obviously in the 
European interest to put primary emphasis on the latter rather than on dollar depreciation; 
anyway both will have to come into play. 
Is it inconsistent of the Euro area to have put so much emphasis on eliminating exchange-
rate fluctuations inside the area and then do so little to constrain movements in the EUR-
USD rate? Some of the same arguments that prompted currency unification in Europe 
apply globally, but the differences in both the functioning of the economies and in policies 
are too great to allow systematic efforts to stabilise exchange rates across the Atlantic. 
Helmut Schmidt used to say: once there is a single currency in Europe the United States 
will recognise the risk of conducting the kind of unilateralist policies that marked the past. 
The current and continuing US Administration has not taken much notice. In that sense the 
Euro area has been a disappointment – and it would have made little difference to bilateral 
monetary and macroeconomic relationships if the Euro area had developed from the start a 
stronger external representation on the political side. It is nevertheless useful that the 
Eurogroup has now anticipated the kind of change contained in the Constitutional Treaty 
draft to abandon the rotating six-month Presidency in favour of a President elected by his 
peers for a couple of years. It is impossible to keep the exchange rate of the euro out of the 
political debate, so the best one can do is to limit the number of participants in the debate. 
An articulated position developed in the Eurogroup should make it a bit more difficult for 
leading national politicians to enter the debate as if their viewpoint represented the whole 
Euro area. In this perspective the ECB should welcome the new structure, although it is 
clear that they are uneasy about it. The ECB could benefit from a cooperative relationship 
with the political authorities rather than being alone on the stage together with some 
national Finance Ministers. 
There is a third area where present arrangements may be said to reflect the somewhat 
narrow focus of the Maastricht Treaty. In order to allow the ECB to concentrate on its role 
in monetary policy there was an effort on the part of Germany and some others to keep the 
new central bank out of financial supervision, indeed to give it no explicit role in 
maintaining financial stability. The argument was a double one: there might be a conflict 
of interest between the two tasks and there was political reluctance to give the already 
strong new central bank power also in this area. So instead the home country control 
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principle in financial supervision was strengthened. Furthermore, over the past decade 
responsibility for supervision in several EU member states has gravitated towards a 
national mega regulator with responsibility for banks, securities markets and 
insurance/pen-sion funds. 
These two developments have tended to marginalise the National Central Banks and via 
them the ECB in relation to responsibility for financial stability. This is a source of 
concern at a time when some institutions, be they banks  or financial conglomerates are 
becoming very large, not only in relation to the financial markets in their home countries, 
but also large enough to be of systemic importance in the Euro area as a whole. Unless the 
ECB and the National Central Banks in the Eurosystem are well informal about the risks 
undertaken by this (small) group of strategically important financial institutions the 
Eurosystem could more easily be pushed into significant injections of liquidity at times of 
crisis than if it had been more continuously informed. 
It will be argued that there is no need to involve the Eurosystem or its national components 
in most supervisory tasks which have very limited implications for financial stability in the 
broad sense. This is certainty correct – as is the observation than national financial 
supervisors have extended their cooperation through networks of bilateral Memoranda of 
Understanding or multilaterally on an ad hoc basic for particularly large individual 
institutions. But the case remains for involving the Eurosystem in the latter types of 
exchange of information and at least for not discouraging the central banks form 
monitoring risks that have a macroeconomic dimension, regardless of the institutional 
framework within which they can be identified. In this context it would have been 
desirable to make use of the provision in the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 105.6 in the original 
numbering) to confer upon the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions23. 
Let me summarise my views on the present challenges. The basic structure of the 
Eurosystem is sound and has proved its ability to deliver what was expected or hoped for: 
the preservation of a historically low and fairly stable rate of inflation based on an efficient 
central banking institution well protected against political influence in its operational 
activities and even in the interpretation of what medium-term price stability means. But 
this unusually clear and purist view of monetary policy inspired some counter initiatives at 
Maastricht or subsequently which should now be re-evaluated in the light of experience. 
The three areas I have referred to have a common element. Governments seem to have said 
to themselves at Maastricht: we are now creating an exceptionally strong and independent 
central bank. Let us now introduce some side conditions to assure that it does not become 
too strong: mild procedures – the EDP – for monitoring public deficits which still leave a 
good deal of room for national fiscal policy, some political influence over the joint 
                                                 
23 It is unfortunate that the Article quoted specifically exempts insurance undertakings as being out of 
 bounds for central banks prudential supervision, since some of the largest financial institutions in the 
 Euro area merge banking and insurance activities. Apparently there was no initiative to reconsider this 
 constraint when the Draft Constitutional Treaty was prepared. 
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exchange rate policy and a clear separation of the responsibilities for monetary and 
financial stability with the latter kept firmly in the hands of national supervisors. 
With the adoption of the SGP in 1997 there was, with respect to the first of these three 
areas a step away from procedures towards apparently firm rules to constrain clearly 
deviant national behaviour. But the recent period suggests that this step was more apparent 
or temporary than real although the final verdict is not in yet. As far as the other two are 
concerned, the role of the Eurosystem remains limited, as was the intention at Maastricht, 
but there is no clear alternative (political) authority to fill any void in the decision-making. 
In the case of foreign-exchange intervention there is now a more permanent Presidency of 
the Eurogroup, but that does not necessarily provide for a clear voice as long as the 
participating countries do not agree amongst themselves. As to prudential supervision and 
regulation the most significant evolution is the emergence of national mega regulators. 
There have been significant efforts to achieve deeper financial integration through the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and more convergence of supervisory practices, but 
there are grounds for doubt whether the slow and somewhat haphazard steps in the latter 
area are adequate for the limited number of large financial institutions with cross-border 
activities that are beginning to emerge in Europe. 
There is a common element in the way the additional challenges and opportunities that 
have become more evident are being faced – or rather not faced. With the Eurosystem the 
first European institution with a federal structure and mandate has been created. There is a 
source of strength for all the participants which should be used fully, rather than being 
jealously circumscribed to preserve tasks for the national and European authorities. On 
fiscal policy national governments should respect rules, not very different from today’s 
SGP. EMU has become robust enough to withstand some transgressions of the rules in the 
short term, but governments endanger both the sustainability of their finances in the longer 
term and the survival of EMU over a similar horizon by treating the shorter-term fiscal 
rules they have agreed to as cavalierly as in the recent past. On exchange rate policy and 
interventions the Eurosystem should be less subjected to frequent political statements that 
make its task more difficult; the new organisation of the Eurogroup may be helpful in that 
respect. Finally, with respect to prudential supervision the political authorities should 
welcome clearer involvement by the Eurosystem in maintaining financial stability across 
markets and institutions. 
 
Some acknowledgements 
More than half a century ago I took up the study of Economics at the University of 
Copenhagen which has remained my base ever since. You may think that the University 
and its Economics Department was then a backwater. It was certainly a small place; in the 
late 1950s only 20-25 graduated annually with a Masters Degree, about one tenth of 
today’s output. But the faculty was highly competent and diverse in its interests. I recall 
with gratitude the inspiring teaching in Monetary Economics by Erik Hoffmeyer, later to 
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become Governor of Danmarks Nationalbank, and in Business Cycles and Growth by the 
late Poul Nørregaard Rasmussen who founded the Institute of Economics in 1958. But we 
were also very well served in Industrial Organisation, International Economics and 
Theoretical Statistics. There was a rich body of practical experience in the Department 
which was drawn upon to illustrate the application of economic analysis to policy 
problems. Finally, there was a regular flow of interesting foreign visitors, and not only 
from Scandinavia. Like many of my successors as graduate students here I was encouraged 
to see when I spent a year at Harvard and MIT that my training was adequate to enable me 
to benefit fully from the inspiration provided by the very best economists. 
In my case much of the inspiration came from Franco Modigliani at MIT. I had the 
privilege of assisting in the preparation of a couple of articles in which the work of Milton 
Friedman on the transmission of changes in the supply of money to prices and output was 
taken severely to task. Nevertheless, and to Franco’s disappointment, I gradually deve-
loped more monetarist sympathies in the course of the 1960s and 70s as reflected in my 
assessment of Friedman’s work for the Nobel Committee, written in 1973. 
After three useful years on the staff of the Danish Ministry of Economic Affairs which also 
gave me a taste for committee work in an international organisation (OECD) I returned to 
the University as Lecturer in 1964 and embarked on a monograph on monetary policy in 
Denmark in the post-war period. I much enjoyed teaching, but found my somewhat 
inconclusive largely empirical research a bit frustrating. So once it was finished I sought 
challenges, first a year and a half as part of a Harvard team of Advisors to the Ministry of 
Finance of Malaysia – for once warning against overly cautions fiscal policy – and then a 
similar period a Head of Monetary Division in the OECD in Paris where early friendships 
with international economists and central bank officials were formed as a by product of the 
preparation of a series of reports on the monetary transmission mechanism in the largest 
industrial economies. 
Returning to a regular chair at the University of Copenhagen in late 1972 I was better 
equipped for both teaching and research; since then I have never been away for more than 
three months at a time. Teaching alternately the two main graduate courses of Money and 
Banking and International Money and Finance provided the main challenges, and as my 
involvement in European monetary integration picked up I could make use of all the work 
of which I become aware in my writings and in graduate seminars. I pride myself that 
students in these seminars were unusually well-informed about both academic and official 
work – and they responded with great curiosity and enthusiasm. I can truthfully say that 
the level of discussion was not notably inferior to that which I could observe in most of the 
many committees in which I took part. And a number of the Master Theses I have 
supervised have taught me a lot and pushed me to raise significant points in international 
contacts. 
In short, over the past three decades or so I see my activities, however disparate they may 
have seemed to others, as quite coherent. I brought back some important policy issues to 
the university in justification of the long periods in which I was partially absorbed 
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elsewhere. Nevertheless, I am deeply grateful to the Institute of Economics for the liberal 
attitude they have shown towards me. It is all the more remarkable since the Institute of 
Economics has derived most of its strength in the last couple of decades from younger, 
analytically advanced colleagues to whom my activities will have seemed rather far from 
the focus on economic research which has become the benchmark of performance. 
The most recent decade has added very valuable experiences for me. One, internal to the 
University, has been the build-up since 1993 of the Economic Policy Research Unit 
(EPRU), most of the time headed by my close colleague Peter Birch Sørensen, the 
organiser of to-day’s conference. EPRU has become an additional source of strength for 
our Department through many contributions to policy analysis in a Danish and an interna-
tional context and it has been a privilege to take part in its activities. A second major 
opportunity for me was the donation by Danske Bank of a Special Professorship in 
International Economics, a position which I had the privilege to hold from 1998 to 2003. It 
gave me the freedom to accept two successive international challenges – participation in 
1998-99 in a panel of three independent evaluators of IMF surveillance and the 
chairmanship since July 2000 of the Economic Development Review Committee of the 
OECD. These experiences have given insight into the effectiveness of international advice 
on economic policies and brought additional inspiration for teaching and research. I look 
forward to continuing my OECD activities for some time yet. 
It has become obvious to me that I have not adjusted mentally to what the Germans call 
“Ruhestand”, a state of quiet and peace. I shall miss the University, in particular the 
regular contact with good graduate students coming to discuss parts of their thesis work. I 
regard those that I have come to know well in this process as my real network and I shall 
continue to follow their progress here or abroad – in the latter case with the hope they will 
return because their talents are very much needed here. 
While I have faced this day and my final lecture with a mixture of pride and nostalgia there 
obvious compensating factors in being relieved of several duties. My family has shown 
great patience with my extensive commitments at the University and abroad and I look 
forward to spending more time with them. In this spirit I dedicate this lecture to my 10-
year old son Nicolas. 
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